According to A0, T is the complete ontological reality: there is no further ontological reality outside or alongside T.
According to A2, in T’s direct self-experience, the whole ontological reality of T is given. This direct self-experience contains no temporal differentiation: there is no passage, succession, “before” and “after,” or experience of change within it.
If time were part of T’s fundamental reality, it would also be given in T’s complete direct self-experience. Since it is not, time does not belong to T’s fundamental nature.
According to A0, there is also no further ontological reality outside T in which time could exist independently.
It follows that:
Time is not a fundamental ontological constituent.
This does not mean that T cannot experience time. In T’s differentiated experiences, succession, change, duration, past, present, and the experience of the passage of time may appear.
Time is therefore not an independent reality existing outside T or as part of T’s fundamental structure, but rather a content of some of T’s experiences.
A further consequence is that we cannot describe T as a whole as if T itself moved through time from one state to another. Expressions such as “first T experiences this, then that” are meaningful only within experiential contexts in which time already appears.