The One T — Version 0.1

Archived version · Published 8 September 2026

This page preserves Version 0.1 of The One T.
For the latest development version, see the current theory.

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DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22655380

Starting Points

Starting Points 2–4 describe informational access as it appears within our present human perspective and universe. They do not assume that spatial, temporal, biological, or object-like organization is fundamental to T.

1. Knowledge concerning existence is accessible only within experience

For an experiencer, any knowledge concerning existence can become accessible only within that experiencer’s own experience.

This starting point does not determine the ontological nature or structure of existence. Nor does it claim that all knowledge originates in sensory experience. It states only the epistemic condition that, for an experiencer, knowledge concerning existence can be accessible only within experience.

2. Experiential information about the surrounding universe becomes accessible through sensory systems

We access experiential information about the universe around us, directly or indirectly, through our sensory systems.

The following cases clarify the scope of this claim. In particular, they address forms of indirect informational access that might initially appear to bypass sensory access.

In the case of an instrumental measurement, for example, we perceive the result of the instrument through some form of sensory access, such as vision. We receive spoken communication through hearing, and obtain information about an object through vision, touch, or another sensory process.

Similarly, if information originating from an external stimulus is later transformed into an internal representation, memory, or thought, this does not alter its original mode of access: the information initially became accessible through a sensory process.

Here, the term sensory systems is used in a broad sense. It includes not only vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, but also biological mechanisms that are sensitive to external or internal states and changes, including pain perception, temperature perception, balance, proprioception, and the perception of internal bodily states.

3. Sensory access is selective and transformative

Sensory systems are sensitive only to particular interactions, states, or changes, and process their effects through their own physical, chemical, and biological mechanisms.

The range and form of information that becomes accessible about the surrounding universe therefore depend on the properties and processes of the sensory system involved.

This starting point concerns only the structure of informational access and transformation. It does not claim that sensory systems themselves experience, nor does it determine what the experiencer is.

4. State-dependent informational interaction is not limited to biological sensory systems

More generally, a change in the state of one system may depend on the state of another system or on an interaction between them. Such state-dependent interactions can produce informational differentiation without requiring sensory organs, a nervous system, or even a living organism.

This principle may apply across different physical scales. Biological sensing is a complex special case of such interaction rather than its only possible form.

This starting point does not yet claim that every such interaction is itself experience. It establishes only that informational differentiation and state-dependent access do not, in principle, require a biological experiencer or a conventional sensory system.

 

Definitions

T: The only ontologically independent reality and the only experiencer. All informational structures and perspectives described by the model are structures or modes of T and are not ontologically independent of T.

Informational Object: A distinguishable informational structure used as a unit of description within the model. Its boundary is not assumed to be absolute or ontologically fundamental. Informational objects are not ontologically independent of T.

Informational State Space: A structured informational domain within T that can be represented in terms of informational objects, their states, and their degrees of membership. The decomposition into informational objects does not imply ontologically fundamental object boundaries.

Universe: An informational state space. Its structure can be represented by the graded membership of informational objects. The concept does not presuppose spatial, temporal, physical, or any other particular type of internal structure.

Degree of Existence: The degree to which an informational object belongs to a particular universe. It is represented by a real number from 0 to 1, inclusive.

If eU(x) denotes the degree of existence of informational object x with respect to universe U, then eU(x) is a real number and 0 ≤ eU(x) ≤ 1.

A value of 0 represents zero membership in that universe, while any value greater than 0 represents a positive degree of membership.

The degree of existence is relative to a particular universe. It is not an absolute property of an informational object.

It does not represent probability, certainty, uncertainty, or lack of knowledge about whether an object exists. Within the model, the degree of membership itself is graded.

It also does not represent a temporal process.

Perspective: A determinate mode of T's experiencing. The concept of perspective does not imply that every form of T's experiencing is perspectival.

Representation: An informational structure within a perspective that represents, describes, or models a referent. The fact that a structure represents a referent does not by itself imply identity between the representation and the referent.

Model Structure

 

1. T and Informational Objects

The informational structure within T can be represented in terms of informational objects.

Informational objects are not additional ontologically independent entities alongside T. They are distinguishable informational structures within T through which the informational organization of the model is described.

Informational objects are defined at the level of T rather than separately within individual universes. Their identity therefore does not depend on their degree of membership in any particular universe.

2. Informational Objects and Universes

A universe is a derived informational structure constituted by the pattern and degree to which informational objects within T belong to it.

A universe should therefore not be understood as a pre-existing container into which independently existing objects are placed. Rather, it is constituted by the structured pattern of graded relations between informational objects and that universe.

The same informational object may belong to different universes to different degrees. It is not recreated as a separate object for each universe. Its degree of membership in a particular universe describes its relation to that universe, not its identity as an informational object within T.

A universe is therefore not prior to the informational objects from which its structure is derived.

3. Representation of Membership

The model does not require a particular data representation for universe membership.

The degree to which an informational object belongs to a universe may be represented as a property associated with the informational object, as a value associated with the universe, or by any formally equivalent representation.

This representational choice has no ontological significance. What matters to the model is the graded relation between an informational object and a universe.

4. Fuzzy Structure of a Universe

For the purposes of the present model, universe membership is represented by real values from 0 to 1. A universe can therefore be represented mathematically as a fuzzy set of informational objects.

The use of a fuzzy set is not intended to represent uncertainty, probability, or incomplete knowledge about whether an object belongs to a universe. It represents the model's claim that universe membership itself may be graded.

The fuzzy-set representation is therefore a mathematical description of the graded membership structure from which the universe is derived.

The use of the continuous interval

$[0,1]$

is a modeling choice rather than a claim that graded universe membership must be ontologically continuous. The model requires only that degrees of membership can be represented in an ordered graded form. Alternative discrete or otherwise structured representations may be used if they preserve the relevant distinctions.

5. Degree of Existence and Ontological Independence

Degree of existence and ontological independence are distinct concepts within the model.

The degree of existence describes an informational object's graded membership in a particular universe. Ontological independence concerns whether something exists independently of T.

According to A0, only T is ontologically independent. An informational object's degree of existence within a universe therefore does not represent a degree of ontological independence from T.

A degree of existence of 0 represents complete absence from that universe, not merely an extremely small degree of presence. As long as an informational object has any informational presence within a universe, its degree of existence in that universe is greater than 0.

Thus,

$$e_U(x)=0$$

 

 

means that

$x$

has no membership in universe

$U$

, whereas any non-zero informational presence implies

$$e_U(x)>0.$$

 

 

This claim is relative to the specified universe. A degree of existence of 0 with respect to one universe entails nothing, by itself, about the object's degree of membership in another universe or about its relation to T.

6. Universe-Relative Properties

The properties of an informational object need not be absolute properties of that object. A property may instead be defined relative to a particular universe.

If

$p$

denotes a property of informational object

$x$

with respect to universe

$U$

, it may be represented as

$$p_U(x).$$

 

The value of

$p_U(x)$

need not be scalar. It may be a number, vector, multidimensional state, informational structure, state space, rule system, algorithmic or program-like structure, or any other informational form relevant to the internal organization of that universe.

Such properties may describe not only quantities associated with an object, but also the structured ways in which it can participate in interactions or other processes within the universe.

If

$$e_U(x)=0,$$

 

then universe-relative properties of

$x$

with respect to

$U$

are not assigned zero values merely because

$x$

is absent. Rather, they are undefined with respect to that universe.

$$e_U(x)=0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad p_U(x)\text{ is undefined.}$$

 

A zero value would still constitute a property value within

$U$

. Undefinedness instead expresses that

$x$

has no membership in

$U$

to which that universe-relative property could apply.

7. Existence and Perspectival Appearance

Universe membership and appearance within a perspective are related but distinct.

If an informational object

$x$

has zero degree of existence in universe

$U$

, then

$x$

cannot appear as experiential content within any perspective associated with

$U$

.

$$e_U(x)=0$$

 

therefore implies the absence of

$x$

from every perspective associated with

$U$

.

The converse does not follow. An informational object may have

$$e_U(x)>0$$

 

while failing to appear within a particular perspective associated with

$U$

.

Thus, absence from a particular perspective does not imply absence from the universe itself.

Axioms

(The axioms are independent of the Starting Points and are not derived from them.)

A0 – Ontological Monism Axiom

Only T exists ontologically independently.

A1 – Axiom of Experiential Unity

Every experience is T's experience.

Remark. There is only one experiencer: T. Differences between perspectives are differences in modes of T's experiencing, not differences between experiencers. No experience occurs independently of T.

A2 – Perspective

What appears as an individual experiencer is a perspective of T.

Remark.
A perspective is a determinate mode of T's experiencing. It does not constitute a separate experiencer or an ontologically independent entity.

A3 — Non-Perspectival Self-Presence

T is directly and experientially present to itself without mediation by a perspective or representation. This direct self-presence constitutes T's immediate certainty of its own existence.

Remark. Direct self-presence is not an informational representation of T and does not require T to appear as an object to itself.

Derived Propositions

The following propositions follow from the axioms, definitions, and model structure.

DP1 — Perspective-Bound Representation of T

Any informational content within a perspective that represents, describes, or models T is a representation of T and is not identical with T's direct self-presence.

By the definition of representation, informational content within a perspective that represents T has representational status. By A3, T's direct self-presence is not mediated by a perspective or representation. Therefore, a perspective-bound representation of T cannot constitute T's direct self-presence.

DP2 — Perspective Individuation Does Not Entail Experiencer Individuation

The individuation of perspectives does not entail the individuation of the experiencer.

Perspectives are distinct determinate modes of T's experiencing. By A1, every experience is T's experience, and by A2, what appears as an individual experiencer is a perspective of T rather than a separate experiencer. Therefore,

$$P_1 \neq P_2$$

does not entail the existence of more than one experiencer.

Non-Entailment Results

The following statements identify relations that are not required by the present model.

NE1 — Representation Identity Across Perspectives Is Not Required

The identity of T does not require representations of T to be identical across different perspectives.

No axiom, definition, or model constraint requires perspective-bound representations of T to have identical informational form across perspectives. Different perspectives may therefore contain identical or non-identical representations of T without implying any corresponding identity or difference in T itself.

Intersubjectivity

1. Multiple perspectives may concern the same universe.
2. These perspectives are not experiences of separate experiencers, but different determinate modes of T's experiencing with respect to the same informational state space.
3. Because these perspectives concern the same informational state space, structural features of that state space may appear across multiple perspectives in mutually compatible forms.
4. The recurrence of mutually compatible structural features across perspectives gives rise to the appearance of a stable, shared, and law-governed world.
5. Intersubjective agreement therefore does not require an ontologically independent reality outside T. It can arise from multiple perspectives of T concerning the same informational state space.

Nothingness

Within the T-theory, “nothing” does not denote an independently existing entity. It expresses absence relative to a specified domain of reference. Three distinct senses must therefore be distinguished.

1. Absolute Nothingness

Absolute nothingness would mean that nothing exists, including T.

Such a condition cannot obtain within the T-theory. According to A0, T exists and is the only ontologically independent reality. Absolute nothingness would therefore amount to the negation of the model's ontology rather than to a possible state of T.

Absolute nothingness also cannot appear as experiential content. If it appeared within experience, then experience would exist; according to A1, every experience is T's experience. T would therefore exist, and the condition would no longer be absolute nothingness.

2. Universe-Relative Nothingness

An informational object may be absent relative to one universe without being absolutely absent.

If

$e_U(x)$

denotes the degree of existence of informational object

$x$

with respect to universe

$U$

, then

$$e_U(x)=0$$

 

means that

$x$

has no membership in

$U$

. In this relative sense,

$x$

is absent from that universe.

This does not imply that

$x$

is absent from another universe or from T. It is possible, for example, that

$$e_{U_1}(x)=0$$

 

while

$$e_{U_2}(x)>0.$$

 

Universe-relative absence therefore does not imply absolute non-being.

3. Perspective-Relative Nothingness

An informational object is absent relative to a perspective when it does not appear as experiential content within that perspective.

Perspective-relative absence is not identical to universe-relative absence. If

$$e_U(x)=0,$$

 

then

$x$

is necessarily absent from every perspective associated with

$U$

.

The converse does not follow. An object may belong to

$U$

with a positive degree of existence while remaining absent from a particular perspective within that universe.

Summary

Nothingness therefore has no positive ontological content within the T-theory. Absolute nothingness is the denial of all existence and cannot obtain within the model. Universe-relative nothingness expresses zero membership in a particular universe. Perspective-relative nothingness expresses absence from experiential appearance within a particular perspective.

These forms of absence are not equivalent. Universe-relative absence implies perspective-relative absence for all perspectives associated with that universe, but perspective-relative absence does not imply universe-relative absence.

Consequences

The following sections examine how the axioms of the T-theory bear on established philosophical problems concerning consciousness and subjectivity. These problems are considered not because they exhaust the consequences of the model, but because they provide well-defined points of comparison with existing philosophical literature and allow non-trivial implications of the axioms to be examined explicitly.

1. The Hard Problem of Consciousness

David Chalmers introduced the term hard problem of consciousness for the problem of explaining why and how physical or functional processes are accompanied by subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995).

Within the T-theory, the problem in this form rests on an ontological assumption that the model does not make. According to A0, physical and informational structures are not ontologically independent of T, and according to A1, every experience is already T's experience.

Physical processes may therefore characterize the structure associated with a particular perspective, but they are not ontologically prior entities from which experience must somehow emerge.

Within the model, asking how non-experiential matter produces experience therefore constitutes a category error: it treats experience as something that must be generated by structures that are themselves already structures within the only experiencer, T.

The relevant problem is consequently transformed. The question is not how physical processes produce experience, but how different informational structures correspond to different determinate modes of T's experiencing.

2. The Problem of Other Minds

The problem of other minds concerns how the existence of genuine experience in beings other than oneself can be known or justified. Its modern form has roots in Cartesian scepticism, while an influential formulation was later given by John Stuart Mill through the argument from analogy (Mill, 1865).

Within the T-theory, however, the problem rests on an assumption that is rejected by the axioms: that another experiential perspective, if genuine, must belong to another experiencer.

According to DP2, the individuation of perspectives does not entail the individuation of the experiencer. The existence of multiple experiential perspectives therefore does not entail the existence of multiple experiencers.

The ontological form of the problem of other minds is thereby dissolved. Another genuine experiential perspective does not require the existence of another ontologically distinct subject; it is another determinate mode of T's experiencing.

This does not eliminate the epistemic separation between perspectives. One perspective does not thereby gain direct access to the experiential content of another. The theory therefore distinguishes the question of whether another perspective is genuinely experiential from the question of whether its experiential content is epistemically accessible from a different perspective.

3. The Combination and Decombination Problems

The combination problem asks how multiple distinct conscious subjects or experiences could combine to constitute a single higher-level subject of experience. The problem is commonly traced to William James and was later named the “combination problem” by William Seager (James, 1890; Seager, 1995). It remains a central challenge for constitutive forms of panpsychism.

Cosmopsychist approaches reverse the direction of explanation by taking a larger or cosmic subject as fundamental. This, however, gives rise to the corresponding decombination problem: how can multiple apparently distinct subjects arise within or from a single encompassing subject? This problem has been developed explicitly in the contemporary literature on cosmopsychism (Miller, 2018).

Within the T-theory, neither process is required. Perspectives are not separate experiencers that must combine into a larger experiencer, and T does not divide into smaller experiencers in order for multiple perspectives to exist.

According to DP2, the individuation of perspectives does not entail the individuation of the experiencer. Differences between micro-level, macro-level, overlapping, or nested perspectives therefore do not imply either the combination or decomposition of subjects.

The combination and decombination problems are thus dissolved within the model by rejecting the assumption common to both problems: that distinct experiential perspectives must correspond to distinct experiential subjects.

References

Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219.

Mill, J. S. (1865). An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green.

James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 272–288.

Miller, G. (2018). Can subjects be proper parts of subjects? The de-combination problem. Ratio, 31(2), 137–154.

Version & citation

The One T: A Working Theory of a Single Experiencer
Version 0.1 · 8 September 2026

Viktor Kis · ORCID: 0009-0000-7397-0567
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22655380

Version 0.1 is preserved as a permanent, citable record on Zenodo. The One T is an ongoing philosophical project, and later revisions may extend or modify the present formulation.